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Governments have been increasingly pressed to solve environ-
mental problems which have been progressively growing and spread-
ing. A variety of environmental regulations have been enacted all
over the world. These include measures enacted to ensure product
safety and sanitary standards. The increased awareness of health and
safety has driven governments to introduce a variety of product stan-
dards. There is little doubt that these trends will continue.
Environmental measures regulating the sale of products - for
example, an environmental tax on products or product safety and san-
itary standards - can particularly impact international trade.' Sup-
pose that a country prohibits the sale of products containing pesticide
residues. Exporting countries may domestically tolerate the residue
* International trade lawyer qualified to practice law in Japan. Trainee, Steptoe & Johnson,
Washington, D.C. Associate, Nagashima & Ohno, Tokyo, Japan (on leave). The author wishes
to express many thanks to Daniel J. Plaine, Esq., Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, and George
Kleinfeld, Esq., Fontheim & Hammonds, Washington, D.C. for their valuable comments and
heartfelt encouragements. The author much benefitted from discussion with Petros C. Mav-
roidis, World Trade Organization, Legal Division, and from attending the seminar held jointly by
Professors John H. Jackson and Alan V. Deardorff in the 1995 winter semester at the University
of Michigan, School of Law. The focus of this seminar was the issue of trade and environment.
The opinions expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author.
1 See generally Vinod Rege, GATT Law and Environment-Related Issues Affecting the Trade
of Developing Countries, 28 J. World Trade 95, 96 (1994).
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of this pesticide up to a certain threshold. In this situation, imports of
this product would be significantly reduced.
The concern is often expressed that environmental regulations
might be enacted in order to protect domestic industries to the detri-
ment of foreign competitors.2 In particular, developing countries fear
that high environmental standards in developed countries might place
a disproportionate burden of cost required to meet these standards on
the developing countries themselves. 3
In this regard, the WTO Agreement4 , in order to encourage inter-
national trade, places various restrictions on a member state's free-
dom of policy choices. Environmental regulations of member states
must accordingly comply with those restrictions, among which the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)5 plays a leading
role in the arena of trade in goods.
First, Article XI generally prohibits quantitative trade restric-
tions.6 Second, Article III sets forth the requirement of "national
treatment"; it enjoins member states from applying internal laws and
taxes "to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production";7 also, it prohibits those internal laws and taxes
which discriminate against imported products in favor of domestic
"like products."8 Third, Article I requires "most-favored-nation"
(MFN) treatment among member states thereby inhibiting discrimina-
tion among products which originate in different foreign countries.'
Lastly, however, Article XX may exempt laws and regulations that are
2 See, e.g., Ralf Buckley, International Trade, Investment and Environmental Regulation: An
Environmental Management Perspective, 27 J.WORLD TRADE, 101, 102 (1993); John H. Jackson,
World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1227, 1235, 1244 (1992) [hereinafter Jackson]; George Kleinfeld, Taxation on Automobiles
and GATT National Treatment Obligations - Where to Draw the Line?, 19 WORLD COMPETITION,
Sept. 1995, 77, 90 (1995); C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations:
The New NontariffBarriers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 47 (1990) [hereinafter Runge (1990)]; C.
FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT- BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 71 (1994) [hereinafter RUNGE (1994)].
3 See, e.g., Runge (1990), supra note 2, at 52-56.
4 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, done Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, annexed to the WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 4 [hereinafter GATT]. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, as amended, is incorporated into GATT 1994. In this article, reference to
an Article of GATT means that Article of GATT 1947, which is incorporated in GATT 1994.
6 GATT, supra note 5, art. XI.
7 GATT, supra note 5, art. III:; art. 111:2, second sentence; art. 111:5, second sentence.
8 GATT, supra note 5, art. 111:2, first sentence; art. 111:4, first sentence; art. 111:5, first
sentence.
9 GATT, supra note 5, art. I.
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enacted in pursuit of any of the legitimate purposes enumerated in
this Article. In particular, Article XX(b) may exempt from above re-
strictions those regulations "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health."'10 Article XX(g) may exempt regulations "relat-
ing to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.""
Environmental regulations often involve a tax on harmful prod-
ucts, or prohibition on the sale of such products. Since these regula-
tions are "internal laws and taxes," which are subject to GATT Article
III, exporting countries may challenge them in reliance on this Article.
If a regulation is inconsistent with Article Ill, in turn, a regulating
country can invoke Article XX as a justification. In particular,
"[q]uite often, concern for environmental matters focuses on
paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX .... ,1, Unless the two countries
can settle their dispute through negotiation, a WTO panel may be es-
tablished to evaluate whether the regulation is consistent with these
provisions.' 3 In order to carry out this task, a panel needs to evaluate
the arguments of the parties, including asserted facts underlying their
reasoning.
Thus, it is critical to determine how these Articles are interpreted,
and further, how a WTO panel should evaluate these assertions and
underlying facts. The latter issue is called the "standard of review."' 4
Under the GATT scheme taken over by the WTO framework, a
number of panels addressed these issues. Despite the absence of the
stare decisis rule,15 in practice, well-reasoned panel reports have been
followed by subsequent panels.16 In addition, the WTO Agreement
provides that "the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures
and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
10 GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b).
11 In this connection, although their discussion is beyond the scope of this article, the WTO
Agreement has added new restrictions on two categories of internal laws, which can include
environmental measures. One consists of restrictions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
which are set forth in the "Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures" [hereinafter Sanitary Code], annexed to the WTO Agreement, supra note 4. The other
consists of restrictions on technical standards for products, which are stipulated in the "Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade" [hereinafter TBT Agreement], annexed to the WTO
Agreement, supra note 4. With respect to these Codes, see generally Rege, supra note 1.
12 Jackson, supra note 2, at 1239.
13 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, arts.
6, 11 [hereinafter DSP Understanding], annexed to the WTO Agreement, supra note 4.
14 See, e.g., JoHN H. JACKSON ET. AL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS 364-66 (3d ed. 1995).
15 JOHN H. JACKSON, TiH WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMiC RELATIONS 89 (1992) [hereinafter JACKSON (1992)].
16 Id. at 89-90.
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to GAIT 1947 .... .17 Thus, a WTO panel must take into account the
past GAT" panel reports.
In the case of United States - Taxes on Automobiles,"8 a GATT
panel recently addressed U.S. environmental regulations on
automobiles which were allegedly enacted in order to reduce the con-
sumption of gasoline. Since this panel report has not yet been
adopted by the contracting parties to GATT, it is not binding on a
WTO panel. However, this report indicated what Articles III and XX
mean in several key aspects based upon detailed analyses. Thus, it is
likely that a WTO panel will respect this panel decision. Nevertheless,
I disagree in many respects with this panel report. Therefore, this arti-
cle first explains my proposed framework and continues with my anal-
ysis of the panel report.19
II. DIscussIoN
A. Summary of My Proposal
The main points of my proposal are as follows:
(a) With respect to Article III:
(i) Article III prohibits any environmental regulation which facially dis-
criminates against imported products in favor of domestic like
products;2
°
(ii) This Article prohibits any environmental regulation which is aimed
at protecting domestic producers even if it is facially neutral;
(iii) A regulating country bears the burden of proving that an environ-
mental regulation is not aimed at protecting domestic producers.
This responsibility is discharged when a regulating country proves
(x) that it objectively needs to achieve the legislative purpose of this
environmental regulation, and (y) that the measures used in the
regulation are more equally treating both domestic and imported
17 The WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XVI, para. 1.
18 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States Taxes
on Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1397 [hereinafter United States - Taxes on Automobiles].
19 This article does not analyze the issue of production process and method (PPM) standards.
However, note 34 infra touches on this issue.
20 In sum, the requirement of national treatment demands the equal treatment of imported
and domestic "like products." E.g., GATT, supra note 5, art. III, para. 5. Past GATr panels
have determined the scope of "like products" under Article III "on a case-by-case basis using,
inter alia, the following criteria: the product's end-users in a given market; consumers' tastes and
habits, which change from country to country; and the product's properties, nature and quality."
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on Japan Customs Duties,
Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, 34 Supp. BISD 83,
5.6 (1988). The analysis of this term "like product" is beyond the scope of this article. As a rule




products, namely, less trade-restrictive2' than any other alternative.
Alternatives to be compared with the subject regulation include,
but not limited to, those involving other products than the subject
product; and
(iv) A WTO panel should accept arguments presented by a regulating
country on these points described in (iii) above unless they have any
manifest error or inconsistency.
(b) With respect to Article XX:
(i) Paragraph (b) of Article XX may exempt those environmental
regulations which are aimed at protecting "human, animal or
plant life or health." However, the aimed level of protection
must be objectively necessary to be achieved;
21 In this article, I use the term "less trade-restrictive" to mean "more equally treating do-
mestic and imported products" in relation to the national treatment requirement. However,
these phrases could have different meanings because the former focuses the reduction of adverse
effect on "trade," which obviously means international trade, whereas the latter places an em-
phasis not on actual impacts on trade, but on impacts on the competitive relationship between
domestic and imported products.
In this respect, Article III demands the equal treatment of imported and domestic products,
and thus does not focus on whether the amount of international trade is increased or decreased.
As a result, the concept of "less trade-restrictive" is essentially alien to Article III; hence, the
standard of "more equally treating imported and domestic products" is a more appropriate us-
age. Past GAIT panels have used the term "less inconsistent with GATT provisions" rather
than "less trade-restrictive."
Past GATI panels have also rejected arguments based on the actual trade effects of a sub-
ject law. For example, in rejecting an argument raised by the United States that a subject law,
applying a slightly higher rate of tax to imported petroleum, has "only an insignificant effect on
the volume of exports", one panel stated that the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of Article III
protected "expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and domestic prod-
ucts." According to this analysis, therefore, the tax violated the Paragraph. General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, 34 BISD 137, 5.1.9 (1988). This statement is cited by another GATT
panel in rejecting the United States' assertion that the panel should examine "actual results" of
past cases under a subject law in evaluating that law's protective effect. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 36 BISD 345, 5.13 (1990).
In contrast, the Sanitary Code and the Standard Code, which address part of the regulations
subject to Article 11, demand that subject regulations be "less trade-restrictive" than any other
alternative. Sanitary Code, supra note 11, art. 5.6; TBT Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2.2. If
these are deemed to set forth special provisions of Article III, they have introduced the different
standard of "less trade-restrictive." Alternatively, if these Codes are characterized as setting
forth provisions supplemental to Article III, the term "less trade-restrictive" would have the
same meaning as the other term "more equally treating domestic and imported products."
I support the latter view, and consequently consider that the term "less trade-restrictive"
means "more equally treating domestic and imported products" in the context of Article III.
Although an analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, I would like to point out
that this view is more consistent with the fundamental policy underlying the WTO Agreement,
namely, the theory of "comparative advantage," and that it is possible to interpret the term "less
trade-restrictive" as meaning "less restrictive of international trade flows which should result
from the competitive relationship between domestic and imported products solely based upon
their 'comparative advantage' (and lack of 'comparative advantage')."
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(ii) Paragraph (g) of Article XX may exempt those environmental
regulations which are aimed at "the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources." In contrast to Paragraph (b), a regulating
country may determine the aimed level of conservation at its
discretion;
(iii) Under both Paragraphs, the measures used in an environmental
regulation must be the least trade-restrictive among all alterna-
tives for the same purpose. Similar to Article III, this assess-
ment should be based upon the availability of other measures
with respect to a subject product, but also that of measures with
respect to other products for the same purpose;
(iv) Similar to Article III, a regulating country bears the burden of
proof on these points described in (i) above. GATI panels
have adopted the "primarily aimed at" standard (iii) above; and
(v) Similar to Article III, a WTO panel should accept arguments of
a regulating country unless they are manifestly erroneous or
inconsistent.
(c) Under either of these Articles, in exceptional cases, a panel
might condemn an environmental regulation (in case of Article
XX, as a "disguised restriction on trade") even if that regulation
appears to meet with the other requirements.
The following sections will put forth the rationales for these argu-
ments, first under Article III, and subsequently under Article XX. In
addressing Article III, this article will focus on Paragraph 2, which
addresses internal taxes and other charges only. Other provisions ad-
dressing other internal laws, Paragraphs 3 and 5, are similar to Para-
graph 2 (as qualified by Paragraph 1) in their terminology22 so that the
discussion of Paragraph 2 is applicable to them without any significant
modification.
My approach in this article primarily relies on the texts of these
provisions. This is a demand of customary international law. Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties23 set
forth a guide to interpret treaties; in particular, Paragraph 1 of Article
31 provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose., 24 It
is widely agreed that these provisions have become part of customary
international law governing the interpretation of treaties.25 There-
22 See GATT, supra note 5, arts. 111:2, 111:3, 111:5.
23 The Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after Vienna Convention].
24 Id. art. 31, para. 1.




fore, it is required to interpret GATI Articles III and XX primarily
based upon their texts.
B. Article III
1. Interpretation of First Sentence of Article 1:2
Paragraph 2 of Article III consists of two sentences. The first
sentence states: "The products of the territory of any Member im-
ported into the territory of any other member state shall not be sub-
ject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of
any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like do-
mestic products. ' 6
Loosely constructing the phrase "in excess of" as meaning "more
severe than," this sentence should be interpreted as prohibiting only
internal taxes that facially discriminate against imported products.
Thus, this interpretation permits any facially neutral tax law.
Although this loose reading appears to deviate slightly from the
ordinary meaning of "in excess of," no other interpretation can be
upheld. Suppose that a member state imposes an internal tax on both
imported and domestic like products if they have a certain product
property other than the origin of products. This law imposes a tax on
some imported products with that property while it imposes no tax on
some domestic like products without the property. If the first sen-
tence prohibits any de facto discrimination like this law, it means that
the first sentence inhibits "the imposition of a tax on a single imported
product in excess of that on any domestic like product." Although
this interpretation appears more consistent with the first sentence, it is
not acceptable.
This interpretation, which more stringently restrains de facto dis-
crimination, generates an absurd outcome. It would permit no tax law
which imposes a tax only on products with a certain product property.
For example, suppose that a country imposes a tax only on certain
food products which contain a toxic substance in order to reduce the
sale of those harmful products. Since some of the imported food
products usually contain that substance while some of the domestic
food products do not, this tax will be imposed on some imported prod-
ucts while not imposed on some domestic products. This result would
be condemned under the above stringent interpretation. Conse-
quently, in order to reduce the sale of these toxic food products, the
country would have to impose the same amount of tax on all of those
26 GATT, supra note 5, art. 111:2, first sentence.
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products irrespective of whether they contain the toxic substance.
This conclusion is unacceptable.
However, where the term "in excess of" is broadly interpreted to
mean "more severe than," my interpretation - that which permits
any facially neutral tax - is not the only possibility. The text of the
first sentence appears to allow one to consider, for example, that the
first sentence inhibits "the imposition of a greater tax on imported
products than that on domestic like products on average." However,
as discussed in Section C, no other interpretation than my framework
is acceptable.
In conclusion, under the first sentence of Article 111:2, any facially
neutral internal tax is permissible. However, it might fail under the
second sentence.
2. Interpretation of Second Sentence of Article 111:2
Under the second sentence of Article 111:2, no internal tax must
be imposed for the purpose of protecting any domestic industry. This
sentence states: "Moreover, no Member shall otherwise apply inter-
nal taxes or other charges to imported or domestic products in a man-
ner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.1127 Paragraph 1
of Article III states: "The Members recognize that internal taxes and
other internal charges... should not be applied to imported or do-
mestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. 12 8
Because the phrase "so as to" usually means an intent or purpose,
it is natural to interpret this sentence as prohibiting any internal tax
which is enacted for the purpose of protecting domestic producers. In
addition, the word "[m]oreover" used at the beginning of the second
sentence indicates that this prohibition applies to any internal tax
even if it clears the test set forth in the first sentence. Thus, even if an
internal tax law is facially neutral, a WTO panel must review whether
the tax intends to protect domestic producers. This is a guide in evalu-
ating de facto discrimination. No other interpretation is appropriate.
This will be further discussed in Section C.2 below.
3. Burden of Proof
(a) Who Bears the Burden of Proof?
The next question is in what situation an internal tax is deemed to
be aimed at protecting domestic producers? First, which party must
27 GATT, supra note 5, art. 111:2, second sentence.
28 GATT, supra note 5, art. 11I:1.
Trade and Environment
16:441 (1996)
bear the burden of proof? A regulating country should bear this bur-
den of proof. This assertion needs to be scrutinized because a chal-
lenging party usually bears the burden of proof that its claim is valid.
It is presumed that any internal tax is at least in part aimed at
protecting domestic producers because governments have an inclina-
tion to protect their own domestic producers from international com-
petition. Although this appears almost self-evident, it is necessary to
look into this in depth for the following reasons. Economic theory
teaches that if a government protects a certain domestic industry, con-
sumers should be worse off.29 The government is normally supposed
to avoid this result because it has to be sensitive to the interest of
consumers, most of whom are citizens with a voting right. However, it
is rather reasonable to consider that the government will rarely act in
such a rational manner. This paradox can be solved by analyzing the
powers and behavior of pressure groups.
First, it is obvious that domestic producers are usually more able
to drive their government to enact a law favoring them over their for-
eign competitors. Foreign manufacturers usually have no employees
who are citizens of a regulating country, or even if they have some,
their number is far smaller than that of their domestic counterparts.
Since politicians are supposed to act so as to gain more votes, they
would tend to favor domestic producers over foreign competitors.
This tendency might be reinforced if labor unions organize a large
portion of employees of domestic producers. In order to ensure job
security, domestic labor unions probably support the protection of
their employers, namely, domestic producers. Labor unions are usu-
ally powerful pressure groups. As a result, they can persuade politi-
cians to favor domestic producers.
How do consumers react? Consumers are usually disadvantaged
by any law protecting domestic producers from international competi-
tion. However, there are ample reasons to believe that their disadvan-
tage will hardly persuade politicians to refrain from choosing a
protectionist measure.
First, the costs to consumers are normally so thinly spread over a
vast number of consumers that they have little incentive to resist a
protectionist measure. In contrast, the benefit arising from the pro-
tection will advantage a small number of domestic producers. Conse-
quently, domestic producers will usually be more eager, and find it
more economic, to lobby.
29 See e.g., Ricr~aw G. LPsEY Er. AL, MICROECONOMICS chpt. 37 (1993).
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Second, most consumers are employees at the same time. As em-
ployees they favor government protection of domestic producers for
fear that their employers might lose in competition with foreign
competitors. 30
Lastly, even if a protectionist measure dissatisfies most consum-
ers, they are not necessarily organized as well as producers or labor
unions. As a result, their opposition might not amount to a strong
driving political force.
And as for distributors and retailers? Indeed, distributors and
retailers of foreign products will suffer a loss from a protective mea-
sure. In addition, they are often well-organized with strong political
muscle. However, their opposition is likely to be set off by those
which deal with domestic products. In particular, if domestic products
have a larger market share than imported products, the advantage to
the wholesale/retail sectors resulting from a protectionist measure
might out-weigh its disadvantage. As a result, their opposition is usu-
ally not enough to overcome the domestic producers' attempt to seek
protection.
It is necessary to further consider the reactions of manufacturers
who use subject products. For example, car manufacturers may pro-
cure materials such as steel from domestic and foreign sources.
Although these manufacturer-users do not necessarily exist with re-
spect to all products, if they exist, it appears that they may be able to
effectively resist the protection of domestic suppliers from interna-
tional competition. This protection usually pushes up the domestic
sales prices of materials above their international competitive prices,
and consequently, increases the production cost of manufacturer-
users. In addition, they are often as well-organized as domestic
producers.
However, their opposition typically would not overcome domes-
tic producers' tendency to seek protection. These users are at the
same time producers, who might seek (or might have obtained) pro-
30 This is a situation of "prisoners' dilemma." Although consumers can be better off by
cooperating with each other to prevent any protective measure, they perceive that they may be
far better off by seeking the protection of only themselves. However, if all of them seek protec-
tion, they will be worse off.
Also, the value of benefits expected to be gained from protectionism might subjectively out-
weigh that of free trade. Free trade does not necessarily guarantee that each individual will be
better off although it will be likely to raise the standard of living on the whole. As a result, while
the benefit of protection appears sure, the benefit of free trade might appear less sure. Accord-




tectionist measures from international competition. If they adamantly
resist any measure which protects their domestic suppliers, they might
not obtain (or maintain) protection in the future. Indeed, if a pro-
posed protectionist measure impacts them negatively by injuring their
international competitiveness, it is likely that they will thoroughly re-
sist the proposal. However, unless this effect is critical, they might
tolerate a protectionist measure on behalf of domestic suppliers.
In brief, most domestic parties will likely be more tolerant than
hostile toward a protectionist measure because they hope to get pro-
tection if and when they need it.31 If all domestic parties are con-
vinced that they should actively resist any protectionist measure, no
such measure will be implemented. However, this is not realistic. In
practice, there remain a number of protectionist measures such as tar-
iffs and subsidies in any country.
In the final analysis, the likely reaction of pressure groups to a
certain protectionist measure would be that some well-organized pres-
sure groups (i.e., protected domestic producers and labor unions)
strongly support it while there are sporadic opponents. In this situa-
tion, even if politicians anticipate that this protectionist measure will
decrease the total welfare of their country, will they dare to oppose it?
If there are a few examples that a protectionist measure has brought
about a favorable outcome, for example, if a previously inefficient in-
dustry has succeeded in restructuring itself under a protectionist mea-
sure, this might provide a protectionist measure on the table with
irresistible attractiveness.
Some may make objections to this view, arguing that govern-
ments would try to comply with the requirements of national treat-
ment under the WTO framework for fear that a violation, in
particular, a sheer violation, will spur sharp international criticism.
However, this restraint does not deter member states from
clandestinely seeking protection by manipulating internal laws. This
restriction is not so clear as the ceiling on tariffs32 and the regulation
of subsidies. 3 In addition, the protective effect of an internal law,
31 In case of environmental regulations, it is necessary to take into consideration the behav-
ior of environmentalist groups. It is pointed out that they are likely to act in the same way as
protectionists of domestic producers. See ARYE L. HILLMAN & HEiNRicH W. URSPRUNG, The
Influence of Environmental Concerns on Political Determination of Trade Policy, in KIM ANDER-
SON & RicHARD BLAcKrtuRsT (eds.) TmE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES (1992). Also,
with respect to the behavior of pressure groups, generally. STEFANIE ANN LENWAY, THE PoL-
TICS OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PROTEMrnON, EXPANSION AND ESCAPE chpt. 2 (1985).
32 GATr, supra note 5, art. II.
33 See GATr, supra note 5, art. XVI, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, annexed to the WTO Agreement, supra note 4.
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particularly if it is facially neutral, is less conspicuous than that of
other protective measures such as tariffs. As a result, the government
might think it possible to tacitly protect domestic producers, however,
within the bounds of Article III.
Thus, although a protectionist measure is likely to adversely af-
fect the domestic economy in its entirety, it is reasonable to consider
that governments tend to favor domestic producers in designing inter-
nal laws. Consequently, whenever an exporting country challenges an
internal law as protectionist, it is presumed that the internal law is at
least in part aimed at protecting domestic producers. Accordingly, a
regulating country rather than a challenging country should be re-
sponsible to prove that a subject internal law is not absolutely based
upon trade considerations. In order to discharge this responsibility,
what should a regulating country prove?
Under my proposal, a regulating country should prove the
following:
(i) A subject internal tax is aimed at a policy goal which is objectively
necessary to be achieved; and
(ii) Any other set of measures available to attain this goal discriminates
against imports no less than the measures used in a subject internal
tax. (However, these compared sets of measures must be able to
achieve the goal as feasibly and in as timely a manner as a subject
internal tax.) Namely, the chosen measures are the least trade-
restrictive.
If they are established, it can be concluded that a country has
introduced a subject internal tax solely in order to achieve a legitimate
purpose, and accordingly, not based upon trade consideration. The
legitimacy of the primary goal of an internal law is not enough to con-
clude that this law is not aimed at protecting domestic producers.
First, unless its legislative objective is necessary, it would be pos-
sible to deem that environmental regulation is used to protect domes-
tic producers. For example, suppose that a country has banned the
sale of all beverages that contain a certain flavoring. Further, it is ex-
pected that this ban will sharply reduce imports of beverages since
most foreign competitors export beverages containing this flavoring
while most domestic producers focus on the production of competing
beverages without the flavoring. Further suppose that although this
flavoring might be harmful to health, it is indisputably proven safe to
consume it up to 10mg per day, and therefore, it is unnecessary to
completely prohibit the customary use of the flavoring in beverages.
In this situation, the regulation of this harmful flavoring can be a legit-
imate policy. However, since it is unnecessary to reduce the flavoring
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in question to zero, it is impossible to deny the possibility that the
regulating country might have attempted to protect domestic produ-
cers by choosing the prohibition of the flavoring rather than a less
stringent restriction. It does not matter whether the regulating coun-
try really attempted to reduce the flavoring, in other words, whether
the protection of domestic producers is the primary objective or a sec-
ondary objective. The text of Paragraph 1 of Article III sets forth no
such distinction.
Also, if a subject regulation is more trade-restrictive than a cer-
tain alternative, a regulating country can be deemed to pursue, at least
as a secondary purpose, the protection of domestic producers by
choosing the subject regulation instead of a less trade-restrictive alter-
native. If it has the effect of favoring domestic producers over foreign
competitors, and this effect exceeds that of the least trade-restrictive
alternative, this excessive protective effect should be deemed not con-
sequential but intended.
(b) Necessity of Legislative Purpose
As indicated above, a regulating country must prove that the leg-
islative purpose of a subject environmental regulation is objectively
necessary to be achieved. In this connection, two points should be
kept in mind.
First, needless to say, this purpose must be consistent with the
objective of Article III. For example, by no means permissible under
Article III is the purpose of imposing a greater tax burden on im-
ported products than domestic products. This obstensibly serves to
protect domestic producers, and is therefore inconsistent with the re-
quirements of national treatment.34
Second, should a panel take it into consideration whether the al-
leged legislative purpose is recognized as legitimate worldwide? No.
Even if a certain legislative purpose is not recognized as legitimate
elsewhere in the world, a regulating country might need to achieve it
for reasons peculiar to that country. The underlying social needs are
usually local.
34 Environmental regulations discussed in this article - for example, product standards -
will normally pass this "legitimacy" test if they pass the "necessity of legislative objectives" test.
These regulations can be presumed to help the sales price of regulated products reflect the exter-
nal effect of these products, and thus, will not run counter to the fundamental policy of the WTO
Agreement, namely, the full realization of "comparative advantage." In contrast, although fur-
ther analysis is beyond the scope of this article, this "legitimacy" test might come to the front
when a WTO panel addresses environmental regulations concerning the situation of foreign
countries, for example, production process and method (PPM) standards.
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Following these considerations, it is necessary to identify what
should be the purpose of a subject environmental regulation. In this
regard, if the goal is not specific enough, i.e., the reduction of a certain
harmful product in any manner, it is unlikely that a regulating country
will succeed in convincing a WTO panel that the measures used in its
environmental regulation are the least trade-restrictive. It is easy to
think of a less trade-restrictive alternative. The purpose must be so
specific as to describe "to what degree a regulating country seeks to
reduce a specified harm." For example, if a country imposes a tax on
certain products with an environmentally harmful property, it must
clarify that it seeks a specific percentage, i.e., 50%, of the reduction of
the then existing unfavorable result from relevant products.
As a result, a regulating country must specify the legislative ob-
jective of a subject environmental regulation up to this level, and
prove that this specified purpose is objectively necessary to be
achieved. Unless the chosen level of reduction is not objectively nec-
essary to be achieved, a regulating country might have chosen this
level of environmental protection in order to protect domestic
producers.
This required specificity of legislative purpose might appear to
impose an overwhelming burden on a regulating country. However, a
country usually estimates the result of a regulation up to this level of
specificity and submission of a "reasonable" explanation is not an ex-
cessive burden.
(c) "Least Trade-Restrictive" Standard on Measures
In addition, a regulating country must prove that the measures
used in a subject environmental regulation are the "least trade-restric-
tive." This will be carried out by explaining that a tax or regulatory
burden imposed by a subject law on each product more properly cor-
responds to the magnitude of the targeted environmental harm the
product generates, than any other alternative measures.
Suppose that a country imposes a tax on automobiles in order to
reduce the total emission of sulphur-oxide (SOx) contained in their
exhaust gases, up to a certain amount. Given that SOx is emitted only
by automobiles, there will be a variety of tax schemes available to
reduce the total SOx emission. For example, the country can impose a
flat amount of environmental tax on those automobiles whose SOx
emission per mile exceeds a certain threshold.
However, this scheme might discriminate between domestic and




SOx emission per mile is below said threshold will not bear any tax
burden although they are partly responsible for the total SOx emis-
sion. Thus, if most domestic automobiles emit SOx in the amount just
below the threshold while most imported automobiles emit SOx
slightly in excess of the threshold, said tax scheme will impose tax on
most imported automobiles but only on a small portion of domestic
automobiles although both are almost equally responsible for the air
pollution targeted by the above environmental tax.
Second, said tax scheme discriminates against, i.e., those
automobiles which run less during their life-time. Suppose that
although a certain domestic model - Model D - can run in a good
condition twice as long as a certain foreign model - Model F -,
Model D is twice as expensive as Model F in the absence of the tax in
question. Given that other relevant factors including the SOx emis-
sion per mile (and thus, the total SOx emission) are completely equal,
it would be reasonable to consider that two Model Fs are a perfect
substitute for one Model D. However, the above flat tax scheme will
change this situation to the advantage of Model D without any justifi-
cation. Since two Model Fs will bear the SOx emission tax twice as
much as one Model D, despite no difference in the targeted environ-
mental harm generated by their use, Model F will become less attrac-
tive as a substitute for Model D. In brief, the flat tax discriminates
against the use of Model F in favor of Model D by imposing a heavier
tax on the former.
In this situation, suppose that the country imposes another SOx
emission tax on each driver in proportion to the SOx emission per
mile of his/her automobile and his/her mileage. This scheme would
reduce the magnitude of possible protection because this scheme
would impose the same amount of tax on automobiles with the same
SOx emission irrespective of their origin. Thus, if this proportional
tax scheme is practicable, it should be concluded based upon the pre-
sumption that any internal law is aimed at protecting domestic produ-
cers, that the country seeks the protection of domestic automobiles by
choosing the flat tax scheme rather than the proportional tax scheme.
In other words, in order to rebut said presumption with respect to the
above flat tax, the country must prove that there is no available alter-
native tax scheme that better reflects the total SOx emission of each
automobile on the amount of tax imposed on the automobile - more
equally treats automobiles in terms of their use - than the flat tax.
In this regard, should a WTO panel take into consideration that a
regulating country could regulate, not only a product subject to a chal-
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lenged regulation, but also other products, in order to achieve a speci-
fied objective? Suppose that both Food Products A and B, which are
not like products, contain the same toxic ingredients, and a country
has imposed a certain amount of tax only on Food Product A in order
to reduce the amount of the toxic ingredients consumed by the public.
Suppose further that in order to achieve the same objective, the coun-
try was able to choose to impose less tax on both products if they
contain the toxic ingredients in excess of a certain threshold. This al-
ternative would more equally treat imported and domestic Food Prod-
uct A (and equally treat imported and domestic Food Product B).
Domestic producers of Food Product A can be deemed to be
protected.
Does this demand that a WTO panel condemn this internal tax
law? Yes, insofar as this alternative of regulating both is as feasible
and timely as the internal tax law the country was chosen. Also, this
result appears to better match the text of Paragraph 1 of Article III.
This provision simply prohibits member states from "afford[ing] pro-
tection to domestic production."35 Accordingly, it does not limit the
scope of products which a WTO should consider to those products
regulated by a subject law. In the aforesaid example, since a regulat-
ing country could have reduced trade-restrictive effect on Food Prod-
uct A, it could be deemed to have attempted to reduce imports of
Food Product A. I do not find any reason to permit the regulation of
only Food Product A under Article III. As a result, it is theoretically
possible to condemn even an environmental regulation that treats
equally all domestic and imported like products, for example, the im-
position of a fixed amount of tax on the sale of all certain like
products.
Past GATT panels appear to stop short of this point.36 Moreover,
arguably a WTO panel should follow this GATI' panel practice. A
treaty should be interpreted in light of "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the par-
ties regarding its interpretation."37  GATT panel reports were
adopted by contracting parties to GATT, 38 and therefore, can be
deemed to constitute this "subsequent practice."
35 Cf. United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, art. %1 3.206-3.208.
36 Cf. United States - Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, art. [ 3.206-3.208. In response
to the EC's argument, this panel could have considered that the United States might be able to
choose gasoline rather than automobiles as the subject of Gas Guzzler Tax, in order to reduce
the consumption of gasoline.
37 Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 31, para. 3, cl. (b).
38 Cf. GATr, supra note 5, art. XXIII.2.
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However, this limitation cannot find any justification in light of
the text of Article III and its legislative objectives. My view certainly
places a significant burden on a regulating country in that it must eval-
uate far more alternative measures. However, this evaluation is prac-
ticable, in particular, because the regulating country is required to
submit only reasonable arguments on the choice of measures, as dis-
cussed later in Subsection 4.
Further, the limitation seemingly recognized under the GATT
practice, if applied to Paragraph (g) of Article XX, would widely per-
mit countries to enact environmental regulations in order to protect
domestic producers, as later discussed in Section D.3(2)(c). There-
fore, I disagree with this GATT practice.
4. Standard of Review
How should a VTO panel evaluate arguments presented by a
regulating country? (Please note that "arguments" here include evi-
dence as well as assertions.) This is the issue of the "standard of re-
view." This subsection will separately discuss the review of an alleged
legislative purpose and that of the choice of measures.
With respect to legislative objectives, a WTO panel can assume
the accuracy of a regulating country's assertions regarding the primary
objective of a subject regulation. My proposed framework will con-
demn a subject regulation which is aimed at protecting domestic pro-
ducers, irrespective of whether this aim is primary or secondary. As a
result, a WTO panel does not have to determine the primary
objective.
Next, how should a WTO panel evaluate whether the alleged leg-
islative goal is objectively necessary to be achieved? A WTO panel
should accept arguments of a regulating country unless they are mani-
festly erroneous or inconsistent.
In order to determine what is necessary to be achieved in a regu-
lating country, it is critical to know a variety of relevant factors. Be-
cause this necessity is based upon needs peculiar to the regulating
country, most of the relevant factors will be related to the domestic
situation of the regulating country.
These domestic factors can be fully investigated only in a regulat-
ing country. As a result, the government of a regulating country
knows them far better than a WTO panel. Also, a WTO panel has
limited authority to conduct an investigation within the territory of a
regulating country. A WTO panel may "seek information... from
any individual or body which it deems appropriate," including those
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"within the jurisdiction of a Member . .. ," and may consult experts to
obtain their opinion."3 9 However, it should be presumed that the gov-
ernment is more reliable than any other individual or body of that
nation because the government has comprehensive authority and far
more resources to conduct investigations within its jurisdiction.
Therefore, if the view of such an individual or body differs from that
of the government, a WTO panel should primarily rely on that of the
government unless it is evidently wrong. As a result, if a WTO panel
wishes to reject arguments of a regulating country, it could do nothing
but rely on those of exporting countries. However, exporting coun-
tries are also unfamiliar with these domestic matters of a regulating
country, and needless to say, have no authority to investigate there.
Thus, what a regulating country presents is normally far more reliable.
As a result, if both parties' arguments appear reasonable, a WTO
panel should show deference to a regulating country.
Another critical issue for a WTO panel is what the standard of
review should be regarding whether a subject internal law is the least
trade-restictive. Similar to the necessity of legislative objectives, a
WTO panel should accept arguments submitted by a regulating coun-
try unless they are manifestly erroneous or inconsistent.
Suppose that the government deems it necessary to reduce the
consumption of a certain food product by twenty-percent or more be-
cause it has turned out that it could cause cancer. To achieve this goal,
various measures are probably available. For example, the govern-
ment may consider completely forbidding the sales of this product.
Also, it would be possible to attain the goal by imposing a certain
amount of tax on this product in proportion to the content of the inju-
rious ingredient. If consumers are very sensitive to their own health,
it might be enough to require that a warning of cancer be labelled on
this product. The choice among these alternatives depends upon vari-
ous factors; for example, to what degree a newly imposed tax will be
reflected in the retail price; how consumers will react to the price in-
crease likely resulting from the imposition of tax; how effectively a
warning will change consumer behaviors. Since a regulating country is
the most knowledgeable about these factors, a WTO panel should de-
fer to arguments of the regulating country.
In this regard, there is always a risk that a regulating country may
arbitrarily choose the facts it argues. However, exporting countries
also have the incentive to arbitrarily select materials for submission in
39 DSP Understanding, supra note 13, art.13.
Trade and Environment
16:441 (1996)
order to protect the interest of exporters. Thus, when it comes to the
possibility of manipulation, there is no difference between a regulating
country and exporting countries. It is therefore inappropriate to dis-
count only the reliability of a regulating country's submission based
upon the risk of manipulation. 0 Rather, since a WTO panel is unfa-
miliar with facts underlying a regulating country's choice, exercising
"judicial restraint," it should accept arguments of a regulating country
unless they are manifestly unreliable.
However, two caveats must be made. One is that said judicial
restraint should be limited to the evaluation of arguments with respect
to matters within the territory of a regulating country. With respect to
matters outside the territory of a regulating country, in contrast, there
is no reason to respect arguments of a regulating country. Rather,
insofar as a challenging country submits reasonable counterargu-
ments, a WTO panel should reject arguments of a regulating country
because a regulating country has failed to meet its burden of proof.
The other is that in exceptional circumstances, a WTO panel
might have to reject arguments of a regulating country, even if they
are related to only domestic matters. For example, when it is fairly
established that a coloring material which is used in food is harmless,
the prevention of distributing food colored by this material could vio-
late Article III even if a regulating country presents facially reason-
able arguments in support of the necessity of the legislative purpose.
In particular, if this prevention has the effect of excluding far more
imported products than domestic like products from the market, it
might be reasonable to consider that the regulating country has at-
tempted to protect domestic producers under the guise of protecting
the health of domestic consumers. In this situation, a WTO panel
could conclude that the alleged legislative objective is a "sham."41
This framework is different from the panel's conclusion in the
case of United States - Taxes on Automobiles. The next section sum-
marizes the panel's report. The section also scrutinizes the EC's view
which emphasized a disproportionate burden on foreign products as
indicia of violation of Article III.
40 The best test of reliability would be carded out in the arena of domestic politics, where all
parties know what is the reality. Thus, the WTO would better ensure the reliability of submis-
sions by making them publicly available.
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C. Discussion of GATT Panel of United States - Taxes on
Automobiles
1. Summary of Panel Report
In this case, three domestic regulations of the United States on
automobiles were subject to complaints by the EC; one of them im-
posed a tax on expensive automobiles; the remaining two concerned
the fuel-efficiency of automobiles. This article focuses on the latter
two environmental regulations: the Gas Guzzler Tax,4 and the Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulation.43
(a) Gas Guzzler Tax
The Gas Guzzler Tax was imposed on manufacturers for those
automobiles which did not meet a certain minimum fuel-efficiency re-
quirement. The level of this tax was inversely proportional to the fuel
efficiency of automobiles: the lower the fuel-efficiency, the higher the
tax. This fuel-efficiency was measured by the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency on the basis of a "model type." Designation of model
type was based upon several factors affecting the fuel-efficiency of
each automobile.44
The panel concluded that the Gas Guzzler Tax was in compliance
with Article III for the following reasons. First, the words "so as to
afford protection to domestic production" appearing in Article III
mean that a regulation must not have either the aim or the effect of
protecting domestic production. Further, with respect to the first sen-
tence of Article 111:2, if neither the aim nor the effect of a regulation is
to protect domestic production, and that regulation sets forth an ob-
jective characteristic of a product as a threshold for regulation, a prod-
uct with that characteristic, and another product without it, are not
"like products."45
Second, a regulation will be deemed to be "aimed at" protecting
domestic production if the nature of the measures used in the regula-
tion suggests that "a change in competitive opportunities in favor of
domestic products [is] a desired outcome, and not merely an inciden-
tal consequence of the pursuit of a legitimate policy goal." At the
time of its introduction, the Gas Guzzler Tax was imposed on most
existing domestic automobiles while it was imposed on a limited
42 26 U.S.C. § 4046 (1995).
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2010 (repealed 1994).
44 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 2.5-2.13.
45 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.23.
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number of imported automobiles. Also, under the scheme of the Gas
Guzzler Tax, "the amount of the tax payable at the threshold [did] not
seem excessive, given the range and progression of the tax."'46 These
facts suggest that the aim of the regulation was not to protect domes-
tic production. 47
Lastly, a regulation will not be deemed to have the effect of pro-
tecting domestic production in the following situation: "[T]he nature
and level of the regulatory distinction made at the threshold [of the
regulation] are consistent with the overall purpose" of the regulation,
and "[do] not appear to create categories of [products] of inherently
foreign or domestic origin." In this respect, the regulatory distinction
of the Gas Guzzler Tax has no such flaw, and hence, it is not deemed
to have the effect of protecting domestic production.48
(b) CAFE
The CAFE law set a required level of corporate average fuel
economy (CAFE) for any manufacturer or importer who sells
automobiles in the United States. With respect to each manufacturer,
however, the CAFE of automobiles produced in the US, and that of
imported automobiles were separately calculated. The CAFE law im-
poses a civil penalty on car manufacturers and importers that fail to
meet a certain CAFE standard. The amount of civil penalty is propor-
tional to the number of their manufactured or imported automobiles,
and also, to a discrepancy between the required standard and their
actual CAFE.4 9
The panel reported as follows. First, since the CAFE of imported
automobiles and that of domestic automobiles are separately calcu-
lated, the CAFE of foreign manufacturers producing only
automobiles of low fuel-efficiency will be low while US manufacturers
which produce both automobiles of low and high fuel-efficiency will
be able to average the two together. Consequently, such an imported
automobile of low fuel-efficiency may bear a civil penalty greater than
a domestic automobile of the same fuel-efficiency. This result violates
Article II.50 Also, Article III does not permit any regulation which
does not treat like products "as such." Since treatment under the
46 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.24-5.25.
47 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.24.
48 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.25.
49 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 2.14-2.24.
50 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 1 5.47-5.49.
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CAFE regulation is based on factors not directly related to
automobiles "as such," it is inconsistent with Article III.51
Second, Article XX(g) may exempt a regulation that is "primarily
aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. If each
of the measures used in a regulation helps achieve this aim, the regula-
tion will be deemed to be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources.
However, the separate calculation of CAFE between domestic
and imported cars does not serve the goal of the CAFE regulation:
namely, the reduction of gasoline consumption. Therefore, the CAFE
regulation is inconsistent with GATr to this extent.52
2. Review of EC's View on Interpretation of Article III
In this case, in support of its challenge against the Gas Guzzler
Tax, the EC maintained:
European manufacturers accounted for most of the gas guzzler tax reve-
nues. In 1990, 73.36 per cent of the total taxes paid were derived from
European manufacturers, although European cars accounted for only 4
per cent of the US market. In contrast, US production accounted for
only 19.91 per cent of total tax paid, although it accounted for 72 per
cent of the US market.53
In essence, the EC argued that if an internal law imposes a dis-
proportionate burden on imported products compared to those on do-
mestic like products, it should be held in conflict with Article III.
Although this view appears to faithfully reflect the text of Article III, I
disagree with it for the following reasons.
Under the EC's view, even if its legislative purpose is necessary
to be achieved, it is possible that Article III will reject an internal tax
law which imposes a far greater tax burden on imported products than
on domestic like products. However, this view protects inferior im-
ported products over superior domestic products. If domestic prod-
ucts of a regulating country are more environmentally friendly than
imported products, an environmental tax on this product will usually
impose a higher burden on the imported products. The EC's view
favors the conclusion that this tax should be condemned due to its
negative impact on trade. The growing trend of domestically pro-
duced environmentally friendly products increases this possibility. Is
this acceptable?
51 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, IT 5.50-5.54.
52 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, IT 5.56-5.67.
53 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 3.111.
Trade and Environment
16:441 (1996)
Further, the EC's view runs counter to past GATr panel reports.
The reports have repeatedly stated that Article III is aimed at protect-
ing "expectations on the competitive relationship between imported
and domestic products, '5 4 and rejected respondents' demand that
panels should evaluate the actual impact on trade caused by a subject
law in order to determine whether it is inconsistent with Article III.
In addition, the EC's view generates another problem. Under the
EC's view, it is very unclear in what situation a WTO panel will deter-
mine that a given internal tax violates Article IlI. For example, if a
ten percent tax is imposed on eighty percent of imported products
while only on ten percent of domestic like products, is this in violation
of Article III? Is it violative to impose twenty percent tax on sixty
percent of imported products, and only on thirty percent of domestic
like products? Nobody can give a clear-cut answer. Accordingly, the
EC's view is not administrable.
The EC's view might even result in loosening the restraints im-
posed by Article III on internal taxes and laws. The EC's view com-
pels a panel to base its decision on subjective criteria, which are not
necessarily persuasive to everybody. A WTO panel would usually feel
some reluctance to condemn a given internal tax. Oddly enough, as
opposed to the EC's probable intent to tighten restrictions on internal
taxes and laws, the possible result would be that almost all of them
would be determined not in conflict with Article III. This provision
would accordingly become of little use.
On the contrary, the subjective standard the EC maintained
might significantly increase the submission of cases to the WTO panel
procedure, and thereby waste limited resources of the WTO. Thus, as
a matter of policy, the EC's view is counter-productive and ill-
conceived.
First, under the EC's scheme, it is difficult to predict whether a
WTO panel will conclude that a subject environmental regulation is
consistent with Article III, and as a result, parties would have diffi-
culty settling a dispute through negotiation. In contrast, under my
proposed framework, a complainant can evaluate the possibility of a
favorable panel decision by confirming whether a regulating country's
explanation is reasonable.
54 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States -
Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Import Substances, supra note 21, 5.1.9. See also General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report United States - Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 21, 5.13.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:441 (1996)
Second, under the EC's view, governments in a dispute could not
easily concede. To do so, their negotiators would need a justification
to persuade domestic pressure groups to accept the result of the nego-
tiation. However, under the EC's "disproportionate impact" stan-
dard, no government could find any persuasive explanation that its
own arguments are weak. In contrast, my proposed framework could
give this justification. It could be more objectively determined
whether arguments are reasonable. Also, from the viewpoint of a
complainant, since this framework provides that a WTO panel will
defer to a regulating country, it will be easy to find justification for
concession.
In summary, no interpretation of Article III should focus on the
disproportionately adverse effect of a subject regulation on imported
products. Any interpretation based upon this approach would impede
a member state from eliminating inferior products from the market,
and would provide no workable rules. Therefore, I cannot accept any
such interpretation even though it appears to be more consistent with
the text of Article III. As an example of my concern, it would, on
average, prevent the imposition of a greater tax on imported products
than that on like domestic products, as mentioned toward the end of
Section B.2.
3. Review of Panel's View on Interpretation of Article 111
It is plausible that the focus of the panel was not directed to the
"actual trade effect." The panel stated: "[T]he Panel did not consider
that these figures [of sales and trade-flow data on automobiles subject
to the gas guzzler tax] in themselves could provide evidence of a
change in conditions of competition favoring domestic
automobiles. '55 Further, the panel appears to rightly focus on the
proportionality of a tax burden on each automobile to the magnitude
of the targeted environmental harm it generates. When concluding
that the Gas Guzzler Tax was permitted under Article III, the panel
took into consideration that "the amount of the tax payable at the
threshold did not seem excessive, given the range and progression of
the tax.
' '56
However, this panel did not present any objective criteria in as-
sessing the consistency of subject laws with Article III. Under this
view, WTO panels can do nothing but to almost always exercise a "ju-
dicial restraint," and consequently, would overlook many
55 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.25.
56 United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.25.
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clandestinely protective measures. This flaw would be aggravated by
the practice that the burden of proof is incumbent not on a regulating
country but on a complaining country. Similar to the EC's view, the
panel's view might also increase requests for WTO review due to its
absence of objective criteria.
In brief, the panel's view would be likely to result in limiting the
possibility of a national treatment violation to exceptional circum-
stances where a WTO panel considered the justification of the regulat-
ing country a "sham." This view eviscerates the function of Article
III. 57
4. Review of Panel's View on Burden of Proof
Although it is not clear from the report, taking account of past
panel decisions, this panel most likely assigned to the complainant the
burden of proving that challenged legislation has either the purpose or
the effect of protecting domestic producers.58
Indeed, it is usually proper to allocate to a petitioner the initial
burden of proving that a claim exists. However, this is the case only
where it is not presumed that a defendant has injured a right of the
petitioner. In the case of internal taxes, in contrast, it should be pre-
sumed that they are at least in part aimed at protecting domestic pro-
ducers, and therefore, that a petitioner, a challenging country, has a
claim.
5. Review of Panel's View on Standard of Review
It is not clear what standard of review past GATT panels have
adopted thus far. This is also the case in United States - Taxes on
57 There remains the issue of whether the national treatment requirement is applied on the
basis of each exporting country, or on the basis of imported products as a whole. Under the
former view, for example, any U.S. law must treat domestic products equally compared to prod-
ucts imported from specific nations, i.e., treat domestic products the same as those from Canada,
Japan, etc. Under the latter view, in contrast, an internal regulation will only be questioned
when it advantages domestic products over those products from foreign countries in general.
In this regard, the panel in United States Taxes on Automobiles concluded that the Gas
Guzzler Tax had no protective effect because this tax did not place a significant burden on Japa-
nese and U.S. automobiles while the EC automobiles bore a significant burden. United States
Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 3.111 Accordingly, this panel adopted the latter view
under Article III. Although an analysis on this point is beyond the scope of this article, in my
view, the texts of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III indicate that under the first sentence of
Paragraph 1, a WTO panel should adopt the "country-basis approach"; in contrast, under the
second sentence, the "all imports basis approach" is proper.
58 Cf. JACKSON ET. AL, supra note 14, at 355.
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Automobiles. A WTO panel should use the standard of review pro-
posed above.
D. Article XX
This Section will address Article XX, in particular, Paragraphs
(b) and (g). In contrast to Article III, past GATT panels have shown
greater convergence in their interpretation of Article XX. As indi-
cated below, I agree with part of the GATT interpretative practice. I
first summarize this practice, and subsequently review it.
1. Summary of GATT Practice
Article XX sets forth exemptions from other GATT provisions.
To explain the qualifying criteria for these exemptions, past GATT
panels have developed the following interpretative practice for
Paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX:
(i) Paragraph (b) exempts those regulations which are "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health," namely, regulations
that are less inconsistent with GAIT than any other possible alterna-
tive measure for this purpose;
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(ii) Paragraph (g) exempts those regulations which are "primarily aimed
at" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources;
60
(iii) The burden of proving that a regulation under review meets the
requirements of Article XX is incumbent on the country invoking
it, namely, a regulating country;6 1 and
59 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on Thailand
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 37 Supp. BISD 200, 74 (1991).
In this case the United States challenged a de facto ban imposed by a Thai trading monopoly on
imports of cigarettes as violative of GATT Article XI, which generally prohibits quantitative
import restrictions. In response Thailand, invoking Article XX(b), maintained that its policy of
prohibiting imports of cigarettes was to protect public health. The panel denied exemptions to
the ban because Thailand could have chosen less-trade restrictive measures, such as non-discrim-
inatory labelling and ingredient disclosure regulations.
60 See e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on Canada
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, 35 Supp. BISD 98, T 4.4-4.6
(1989); United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.58. The former case addressed
Canadian prohibition on the exportation or sale for export of unprocessed herring and salmon.
In response to the U.S. claim that this prohibition violated Article XI, Canada contended that
the measures under review were permitted under Paragraph (g) of Article XX because they
provided information on the harvesting of herring and salmon, thereby aiding in their conserva-
tion. However, the panel concluded that because the ban was imposed only on exports, it could
not be deemed to be "primarily aimed at" conserving herring and salmon stocks, and therefore,
the ban was impermissible.
In my view, the "primarily aimed at" standard deviates from the term "related to." See also,
Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. World
Trade 37, 50 (1991).
61 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on Canada
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 30 Supp. BISD 140, 5.20 (1985); General
Trade and Environment
16:441 (1996)
(iv) A regulation is not "a disguised restriction on international trade."
if it "had been taken as a trade measure and publicly announced as
such.",
62
As indicated in Section A of this article, the practices above
should be revised in the following manner:
(u) Paragraph (b) of Article XX may exempt those environmental regu-
lations which are aimed at protecting "human, animal or plant life or
health." However, the aimed level of protection must be objectively
necessary to be achieved;
(v) Paragraph (g) of Article XX may exempt those environmental regu-
lations which are aimed at "the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources." In contrast to Paragraph (b), a regulating country may
determine the aimed level of conservation at its discretion;
(w) Under both Paragraphs, the measures used in an environmental
regulation must be the least inconsistent with other GATr provi-
sions among all alternatives for the same purpose. Similar to Arti-
cle III, this assessment should be based upon the availability of
other measures with respect to a subject product, but also that of
measures with respect to other products for the same purpose;
(x) Similar to Article III, a regulating country bears the burden of proof
on these points;
(y) Similar to Article HI, a WTO panel should accept arguments of a
regulating country unless they are manifestly erroneous or
inconsistent;
(z) A regulation may be condemned as "a disguised restriction" if the
alleged legislative objective is deemed a "sham."
The panel of United States - Taxes on Automobiles followed the
past GATT panels' interpretation of Paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 39 Supp. BISD 98, 5.22 (1993).
The former case addressed a Canadian law requiring that foreign investors in Canada
purchase Canadian-made materials. Canada contended that the law was permitted under Para-
graph (d) of Article XX even if it violated Article III. The panel held that the responsibility to
demonstrate that the law met with the requirements under Article XX was incumbent on Can-
ada because this provision set forth exceptions.
The latter case is often cited as Tuna/Dolphins I. Mexico claimed that the United States
violated Article III by prohibiting imports of tuna harvested through a method entailing the
mass-killing of dolphins in excess of a certain standard. The panel determined that this prohibi-
tion was not permitted under Article III, and subsequently, that a party invoking exemptions
under Article XX should bear the burden of proof.
62 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States Prohi-
bition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, 29 Supp. BISD 91, J 4.8 (1983).
Based upon Article XI, Canada challenged the U.S. prohibition on imports of tuna and tuna
products followed the seizure of fishing vessels and arrest of U.S. fishermen by Canadian author-
ities. Evaluating the U.S. invocation of Paragraph (g) of Article XX, the panel determined that
"the United States action should not be considered to be a disguised restriction on international
trade, noting that the United States prohibition ... had been taken as a trade measure and
publicly announced as such." ld.
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XX, as summarized in (i) to (iv) above. Thus, the next subsection,
which reviews this panel decision, will explain the rationales for the
views from (u) to (z).
2. Review of GATT Practice
(a) Texts of Paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX
Paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX state:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Mem-
ber of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption;
(b) Legislative Purpose of Regulations
(i) Necessity of Legislative Purpose
First, it is obvious from the texts of these paragraphs, in order to
be qualified for these Article XX exemptions, the underlying objec-
tive of a regulation must fall within a range set forth in Article XX. In
this regard, under Article III, the legislative objective of a subject in-
ternal tax must be specific enough to enable a regulating country to
prove that its chosen measure is the least trade-restrictive. This is also
the case under Article XX because this provision also require that the
measure is the least trade-restrictive, as explained later in Subpara-
graph (c).
Further, in my view, under Paragraph (b) of Article XX, not only
must the legislative objective of an environmental regulation be the
protection of human health, etc., but also the specified aimed level of
the protection must be objectively necessary.63 This requirement is
the same as that which Article III requires with respect to the neces-
sity of legislative objectives, as explained in Section B.3(b) above.
This interpretation is supported by the text of Paragraph (b) of Article
XX, which can exempt only measures "necessary to protect" human
63 Contra, Charnovitz, supra note 60, at 49.
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life, etc. It would be absurd under the proposed framework to inter-
pret Paragraph (b) otherwise. Should Paragraph (b) not demand this
necessity of legislative objectives, it could permit even an environmen-
tal regulation which fails under Article III, for example, an environ-
mental regulation whose legislative objective is not necessary, and
hence, which was probably taken in order to protect domestic produ-
cers. This interpretation emasculates the national treatment
requirement.
In contrast, Paragraph (g) does not require that the legislative
purpose of an internal law be objectively necessary. This provision
uses the term "relating to" instead of "necessary," which is used in
Paragraph (b).
This difference in the necessity of legislative purposes between
Paragraphs (b) and (g) is supported not only by the difference in their
terminology, but also by the difference in the nature of the legislative
purposes mentioned in these provisions. The evaluation of the "ne-
cessity" under Paragraph (g) requires considerations of not only do-
mestic factors but also information available only in foreign countries,
and consequently, a regulating country can hardly prove this necessity.
Let me clarify this through an example of measures which are
supposed to be typically addressed under Paragraph (g), namely, ex-
ports restraints on exhaustible natural resources. Suppose that in or-
der to conserve the reserve of crude oil for future generations, a
country restricts the domestic consumption of oil products, and at the
same time, limits exports of the oil products up to a certain amount.
In this regard, Article XI generally prohibits quantitative trade restric-
tions on exports as well as imports; however, it permits "[e]xport
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve
critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the ex-
porting Member."' Under Article XI, this is the sole exemption
which could be applied to quantitative export restrictions on exhaus-
tible natural resources. Therefore, insofar as foreign oil products is
available to the regulating country enough to meet with its domestic
demand, the export ban will violate Article XI. Subsequently, a WTO
panel would evaluate whether Paragraph (g) of Article XX exempts
this export ban.
If Paragraph (g) requires the necessity of legislative objectives,
the level of limitation on exports must be necessary in light of not only
the amount of domestic reserves but also the amount of foreign
64 GATr, supra note 5, art. XI.2(a).
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reserves. Under my framework, a regulating country bears the bur-
den of proof of this necessity. Thus, if foreign countries which have
reserves put forth counterarguments with respect to the estimated
amount and future availability of their reserves to the regulating coun-
try, by adopting these counterarguments, a WTO panel must reject
arguments of the regulating country. However, the estimates of for-
eign countries might turn out wrong in the future. Also, there is no
certainty that these foreign countries will supply their reserves to the
regulating country in the future as they have argued. As a result, if
Paragraph (g) demands the necessity of legislative objectives, a coun-
try would be forced to rely on uncertain foreign supply. This result is
unacceptable to any country.
Consequently, in contrast to Paragraph (b), Paragraph (g) should
be interpreted to permit any level of conserving exhaustible natural
resources even if it appears unnecessary. In other words, under Para-
graph (g), a country may choose the level of conservation at its
discretion.
(ii) What Are "Exhaustible Natural Resources" Mentioned in
Paragraph (g)?
As indicated above, Paragraph (g) does not question whether a
subject law pursues a necessary level of conservation of exhaustible
natural resources. Therefore, there is a significant risk that such laws
will be used to protect domestic producers, and thus, it is important to
clarify the scope of "exhaustible natural resources" mentioned in Par-
agraph (g). This scope should be limited at least in the following
manner.
In my view, Paragraph (g) cannot exempt any measure which a
country takes in order to conserve exhaustible natural resources
outside its territory because this permission runs counter to the funda-
mental policy of the WTO Agreement.
It is widely agreed that the principal policy goal of the WTO
framework is "to liberalize trade that crosses national boundaries, and
to pursue the benefits described in economic theory as 'comparative
advantage.' "65 This theory of "comparative advantage" indicates that
a country can produce goods and services more efficiently by special-
izing in producing those goods and services in which it has "compara-
tive advantage." Further, by exchanging products which are more
efficiently produced because of this specialization, all countries can be
65 Jackson, supra note 2, at 1231.
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better off. As a result of specialization, those industries in each coun-
try which have no "comparative advantage" are supposed to shrink.
In turn, resources used by those industries will be reallocated to those
other industries which have "comparative advantage"; consequently
these resources will be used more efficiently.
The endowment of exhaustible natural resources consists in part
of "comparative advantage." Therefore, it is rational to permit coun-
tries to choose the level of conservation of their own exhaustible natu-
ral resources at their discretion. To the contrary, if a country can
freely determine the level of conservation, namely, the level of pres-
ent use, of exhaustible natural resources in foreign countries, it would
hinder those foreign countries from realizing their own "comparative
advantage." This outcome runs counter to the fundamental objective
of the WTO Agreement. Therefore, "exhaustible natural resources"
mentioned in Paragraph (g) of Article XX should be limited to those
within the territory of a regulating country.
The text of Paragraph (g) confirms this limitation. This provision
focuses on exhaustible natural resources of a regulating country in
that it can exempt environmental measures only if "such measures [re-
lating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources] are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."66 It is natural to consider that "domestic" qualifies
"consumption" as well.
(c) Choice of Measures
The next question is what measure a regulating country should
choose to pursue a given objective. At a minimum, it must be less
trade-restrictive than any other alternative. This is the case under
either Paragraph (b) or (g) of Article XX.
First, the title of Article XX "General Exceptions" indicates that
this provision sets forth exceptions to other GATT provisions. As a
matter of principle, exceptions should be narrowly interpreted.
Second, Article XX says, "nothing in this [GATT] Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of ...
measures . . .," for example, "(g) relating to the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources . . . ." Since this text does not expressly
permit either "any" such measure or "all" such measures, it could be
read as confirming only that a member state reserves the authority to
pursue enumerated purposes. This authority can be reserved even
66 GAT, supra note 5, art. XX(g).
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when Article XX permits only measures which are the least inconsis-
tent with other GATT provisions among all alternatives. There is no
need to permit any measure which is more trade-restrictive.
Therefore, the practice of GATT panels with respect to Para-
graph (b), as summarized in (a)(i) above, is plausible.67 Also, a WTO
panel should apply this framework to Paragraph (g) rather than the
seemingly established interpretative practice of the "primarily aimed
at" standard. Under the present practice, a country can seek the pro-
tection of its domestic producers by choosing a regulation which is not
the least trade-restrictive.
This difference between the GAYT practice and my framework
hinges on the difference in their emphasis within the text of
Paragraphs (b) and (g). As indicated above, in contrast to my frame-
work, GAT panels relied on the term "necessary (to protect human
health, etc.)" in Paragraph (b) when drawing the requirement of "the
least trade-restrictive." GATI panels similarly focused on the term
"related to (the conservation of exhaustible natural resources)" in
Paragraph (g), following which they interpreted this "related to" as
meaning "primarily aimed at."
However, as indicated above, this difference in terminology re-
lates to the necessity of legislative objectives. As a result, this differ-
ence is irrelevant to whether Paragraphs (b) and (g) requires that the
measures used in a subject regulation be the "least trade-restrictive."
Therefore, the GATT" practice cannot be upheld.
Further, similar to Article III, when evaluating the choice of
measures in light of the "least trade-restrictive" standard, a WTO
panel should take into consideration not only the availability of alter-
native measures concerning a subject product but also that relating to
any other products. There is no reason to adopt a different view with
respect to Article XX. Also, if the scope of evaluation is limited to a
product subject to an environmental regulation at issue, Paragraph (g)
of Article XX would unnecessarily permit countries to use environ-
mental regulations in order to protect domestic producers.
Under my framework, Article III demands that the legislative
purpose of environmental regulations be objectively necessary to be
achieved. In contrast, Paragraph (g) of Article XX can exempt envi-
ronmental regulations which are aimed at conserving exhaustible nat-
ural resources, irrespective of whether this aim is necessary. Thus, in
67 Contra, Robert F. Housman and Durwood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental




reliance on Paragraph (g), a country could enact an environmental
regulation to protect domestic producers by choosing any unnecessary
level of conservation as its legislative purpose.
Accordingly, if only measures related to a subject product are
considered under the "least trade-restrictive" test, a country could en-
act protectionist measures on any product consuming exhaustible nat-
ural resources under the guise of conservation of these resources.
Much worse, the scope of such products is very broad. For example,
any electric appliance can be included because they consume electric
power which is generated by thermal power stations using oil or coal.
In my view, this is not acceptable.
This problem would be solved if a WTO panel considers not only
possible measures with respect to a product subject to a challenged
environmental regulation, but also the availability of measures with
respect to other products. Since a regulating country can usually di-
rectly restrict the consumption of exhaustible natural resources more
feasibly and in a more timely manner, it is highly likely that indirect
conservation measures will be determined not the "least trade-
restrictive."
This analysis supports the broader inclusion of measures to be
considered in applying the "least trade-restrictive" standard. There is
no theoretical justification to apply this broader inclusion only with
respect to Paragraph (g) of Article XX (or only with respect to Article
XX) while not to Article III. Thus, I maintain that a WTO panel
should adopt the more stringent framework in evaluating whether the
measures used in an environmental regulations are the "least trade-
restrictive" under both Articles III and XX.
(d) Burden of Proof
Which party should bear the burden of proving that a subject reg-
ulation meets these requirements with respect to its underlying objec-
tive and choice of measures? It appears to be agreed that a regulating
country should bear this burden.68
It would be easier to justify this answer in case of Article XX than
Article III. Paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX set forth exceptions
from other GAT obligations on member states.69 Also, as above I
pointed out in Section B.3, it is presumed that a regulation is biased to
the advantage of domestic producers. Hence, the burden of proof
68 See JACKSON ET. AL, supra note 14, at 355-57.
69 GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b) and (g).
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should be on the regulating country which invokes these exceptions
and attempts to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, the regulating
country should do the following:
(i) specify the policy goal in question (for example, in case of United
States - Taxes on Automobiles, to what degree the United States plans
to reduce the consumption of gasoline);
(ii) under Paragraph (b), prove that this specified goal is objectively
necessary to be achieved; and
(iii) substantiate that the regulation is the least trade-restrictive among
possible alternative measures to attain that goal.
(e) Standard of Review
Fourth, similar to Article III, it is necessary to clarify how a WTO
panel should review arguments of parties. In my view, the process
should be the same as explained in Section B.4 above; a WTO panel,
exercising a judicial restraint, should accept arguments of a regulating
country unless they show any manifest error; however, with respect to
matters outside the territory of a regulating country, a WTO panel
should reject a regulating country's arguments if a challenging country
presents reasonable counterarguments.
(f) "A Disguised Restriction on International Trade"
In exceptional cases, a regulation may be denied exemption as "a
disguised restriction on international trade,"7 even if it satisfies other
requirements under Article XX. Suppose the following: (i) that a reg-
ulation in fact puts a burden almost exclusively on imported products;
(ii) that this burden is very great; (iii) that it is a bit doubtful that the
asserted legislative purpose is necessary to be achieved. In this case, a
WTO panel could deem the regulation as seeking to protect domestic
producers at least as an ulterior purpose, namely, as "a disguised re-
striction on international trade."
In contrast, a past GATT panel indicated that a regulation is not
"a disguised restriction on international trade," if it "had been taken
as a trade measure and publicly announced as such."'" However, this
interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of "dis-
70 Obviously, "[a] disguised restriction on international trade" is related to the national
treatment requirement. In contrast, "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail" concerns a violation of the MFN requirement. The detailed
analysis of the latter provision is beyond the scope of this article. However, in my view, it en-
ables a WTO panel to reject in exceptional cases a measure which could be deemed to discrimi-
nate against a member state in favor of another member state.
71 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Report on United States
Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, supra note 62, 4.8.
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guised," and hence, cannot be sustained.72 In this connection, I would
like to again call attention to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention.
This provision, which constitutes part of customary international
law,73 demands that an international agreement be interpreted pri-
marily based upon the ordinary meaning of the words used in the
agreement.
(g) Regulations of Products "as Such"
As exemplified in the panel on United States - Taxes on
Automobiles, GATT panels have frequently questioned whether a
subject regulation treats like products "as such."'74 Although this ap-
pears to be an established practice, I believe that this practice should
be abandoned for the following three reasons.
First, this is not a clear-cut criterion. Hence, this makes it difficult
for member states to predict the outcome of a panel review. Second,
under my framework, this requirement is of no use. The "as such"
standard deems that any internal law treating products not "as such"
is in violation of Article III, and consequently subjects it to potential
review under the strict requirements of Article XX. However, under
my framework, a WTO panel will review this internal law under Arti-
cle III with almost the same test as used under Article XX.
Third, the "as such" standard could theoretically generate an ab-
errational outcome. Under this standard, how should competition
laws be treated? Competition laws usually regulate corporate behav-
iors including that of domestic producers and importers, not products
they deal with; for example, the prevention of predatory pricing ad-
dresses, not the sales price of individual products, but the pricing of a
line of products. Without a doubt, competition laws are "internal
laws," which are subject to Article III. Further, most restraints in
competition law treat products not "as such." Therefore, the "as
such" standard would normally reject competition laws. Nevertheless,
Article XX could not save any competition law because the purpose
of competition laws - although depending upon the jurisdiction, for
example, the maintenance of competition - is not mentioned in any
Paragraph of Article XX.
72 See, eg., Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law: Article XX of GATT, 26
J.WORLD TRADE 63, 74 (1992); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and Interna-
tional Environmental Law: Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental Dispute in
GA7T, 27 J. WoRLD TRADE 43, 55 (1993).
73 HENKIN, ET. AL, supra note 25, at 416-18.
74 See e.g., United States Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 18, 5.50.
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Needless to say, I do not believe that any WTO panel would con-
clude from the "as such" standard that any competition law violates
GAT. However, I do not find any theoretical explanation of why a
panel could reject this conclusion. In my view, the logical possibility
of this absurd outcome clearly indicates that the "as such" standard is
alien to Article III.
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, this article proposes the fol-
lowing interpretation of Articles III and XX:
(a) With respect to Article III:
(i) Article III prohibits any environmental regulation which facially
discriminates against imported products in favor of domestic like
products;
(ii) This Article prohibits any environmental regulation which is
aimed at protecting domestic producers even if it is facially
neutral;
(iii) A regulating country bears the burden of proving that an envi-
ronmental regulation is not aimed at protecting domestic produ-
cers. This responsibility is discharged when a regulating country
proves (x) that the legislative purpose of this environmental regu-
lation is objectively necessary to be achieved, and (y) that the
measures used in the regulation are more equally treating domes-
tic and imported products, namely, they are less trade-restrictive
than any other alternative. Alternatives to be compared with the
subject regulation include, but are not limited to, those involving
other products than the subject product; and
(iv) A WTO panel should accept arguments presented by a regulating
country on these points described in (iii) above unless they are
manifestly erroneous or inconsistent.
(b) With respect to Article XX:
(i) Paragraph (b) of Article XX may exempt those environmental reg-
ulations which are aimed at protecting "human, animal or plant
life or health." However, it is required that a regulating country
objectively needs to achieve the aimed level of protection;
(ii) Paragraph (g) of Article XX may exempt those environmental
regulations which are aimed at "the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources." In contrast to Paragraph (b), a regulating
country may determine the aimed level of conservation on its
discretion;
(iii) Under both Paragraphs, the measures used in an environmental
regulation must be the least trade-restrictive among all alterna-
tives for the same purpose. Similar to Article III, this assessment
should be based upon the availability of other measures with re-
spect to a subject product, but also that of measures with respect
to other products for the same purpose;
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(iv) Similar to Article III, a regulating country bears the burden of
proof on these points described in (i) to (iii) above; and
(v) Similar to Article III, a WTO panel should accept arguments of a
regulating country unless they are manifestly erroneous or
inconsistent.
(c) Under either of these Articles, in exceptional cases, a panel might
condemn an environmental regulation (in case of Article XX, as a
"disguised restriction on trade") even if that regulation appears to
meet the other requirements.
